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THE EVOLUTION OF PRP STANDING UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE-
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980
ROBERT P. REDEMANN & MICHAEL F. SMITH*
INTRODUCTION
The current "hotly-debated legal question"' under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 19802
("CERCLA") is whether potentially responsible parties ("PRPs")3 can pursue
Robert Redemann is a partner in the Tulsa, Oklahoma law firm of Rhodes, Hieropympus,
Jones, Tucker & Gable. Mr. Redemann received his B.S, from the University of Wisconsin-
Madison in 1973 and his J.D. from the University of Tulsa College of Law in 1978. Michagl
F. Smith is an associate with the Tulsa, Oklahoma law firm of Rhodes, Hieronymus, Jones,
Tucker & Gable. Mr. Smith received his B.S. from Oklahoma State University in 1,97 and
his J.D. from the University of Tulsa College of Law in 1991.
Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1403 (D. Ariz. 1996).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94
Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. IV 1980)). Congress amended
CERCLA in 1986. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. IV 1986)).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). That section lists four categories of PRPs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
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a cost recovery action under section 107(a) of CERCLA,4 or whether PRPs
are limited to a contribution action under section 113(f) of CERCLA.5 The
federal courts are split on the resolution of this issue. The inconsistency
among the federal courts of appeals can be explained by categorizing the
cases based on whether there has been an adjudication of liability with
respect to the Superfund site prior to the PRP seeking costs. Where there has
not been an adjudication of liability, a PRP who cleans up a site is permitted
to seek response costs under section 107(a) as an initial action. Where a
PRP's liability with respect to a Superfund site has been adjudicated,
however, whether through a consent decree or a trial, then any subsequent
action for costs is truly a contribution action and should be brought pursuant
to section 113(o. A recent trend, however, has emerged in the federal district
courts indicating that PRPs can pursue cost recovery actions under section
107(a) based on the plain language of CERCLA, without need for
categorizing the authority based upon whether liability with respect to the
Superfund site has been adjudicated.
4 Id. That section provides that PRPs are liable for:
. (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or
loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried
out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. § 9607(a)(4).
Id. § 9613(f). That section provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is
liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or
following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section
9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this
section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed
by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
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This article argues that a PRP who finances a Superfund cleanup
without an adjudication of liability, regardless of that PRP's motivation,
should be permitted to pursue a cost recovery action under section 107(a) as
an initial action. This interpretation of CERCLA is consistent with the plain
language of the statute, Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA, and the public
policy behind CERCLA. Despite the plain language of the statute, numerous
courts have limited PRPs to contribution actions under section 113(f). The
ultimate resolution of the issue of PRP standing under section 107(a), either
by Congress or the U.S. Supreme Court, will have a monumental impact on
the future effectiveness of the cleanup of Superfund sites throughout the
United States. A resolution which permits PRPs to pursue a cost recovery
action as an initial action under section 107(a) would encourage PRPs to
cooperate with the government and finance the prompt cleanup of Superfund
sites. Such a result would be consistent with Congress' objectives in enacting
CERCLA.
i. A COMPARISON OF COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 107(a)
AND CONTRIBUTION ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 113(f)
Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA provides a cause of action for
persons to seek recovery of cleanup costs.6 Under section 107(a)(4)(B), any
person who conducts the cleanup of a Superfund site can file a cost recovery
action to seek any "necessary costs of response incurred by [that] person
consistent with the national contingency plan" ("NCP").7 That cost recovery
action may be brought against any PRP.8
Section 107(a)(4)(B) offers an attractive cause of action to those who
funded the cleanup of a Superfund site and are subsequently seeking response
costs from PRPs. Under section 107(a)(4)(B), defendants are held jointly and
severally liable for all costs incurred.9 Such liability enables the person who
6 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
8 See id. § 9607(a).
9 See, e.g., Versatile Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
Until recently, liability under CERCLA had been unanimously retroactive as well. See, e.g.,
Virginia Properties, Inc., v. Home Ins. Co., 74 F.3d 1131, 1132 (11 th Cir. 1996); Long
Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1366 (9th
Cir. 1994); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1505-06 (6th Cir. 1989);
O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178, 183 n.12 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto
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funded the cleanup to hold all PRPs liable for the entire amount of the
cleanup costs consistent with the NCP.1° Additionally, a cost recovery action
under section 107(a) has a lengthy six-year statute of limitations for remedial
actions, which begins to run upon the "initiation of physical on-site
Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-75 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-37 (8th Cir. 1986); Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D.
Nev. 1996); HRW Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 329 (D.
Md. 1993); Abbott Labs. v. Thermo Chem, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 135, 138 (W.D. Mich. 1991);
United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 428-31 (D.N.J. 1991); City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan Chem. Co., 748 F. Supp. 283, 287-89 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Amland Properties Corp. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 790-91 (D.N.J. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent
Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1442-45 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp.
615, 621-22 (D.N.H. 1988); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp.
546, 556-58 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Miami Drum Servs., Inc., 25 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1469, 1476-78 (S.D. Fla. 1986); United States v. Tyson, 25 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1897, 1907-08 (E.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 451-
52 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1397-99 (D.N.H.
1985); Mayor & Board of Aldermen v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 668-69
(D.N.J. 1985); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898-99 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 218-21 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United
States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-77 (D. Colo. 1985); Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. 1300, 1302-14 (N.D. Ohio 1983); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty
Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn. 1994).
Recently, however, an Alabama district court, despite the weight of authority to the
contrary, concluded that CERCLA liability does not apply retroactively. See United States
v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1519 (S.D. Ala. 1996). The United States has appealed
the district court's decision. See United States v. Olin Corp., appeal docketed, No. 96-6645
(1 lth Cir. July 25, 1996); see also Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) Pending Litigation 66,483.
It is predicted that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit will reverse the district
court. See Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, Questioning Some CERCLA Principles,
N.Y. L.J., June 28, 1996, at 3, 40.
1 See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1403-04 (D.
Ariz. 1996).
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construction of the remedial action,"" and a three-year statute of limitations
from completion of a removal action.'2
Contribution actions, on the other hand, are less favored by those
persons who funded the cleanup of a Superfund site and are subsequently
seeking response costs from PRPs. Under contribution, liability is arguably
several only.'3 Furthermore, numerous apportionment issues become relevant
under contribution's several liability which generally are not at issue when
defendants face joint and several liability.' 4 The presence of these issues
See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2). That section pertinently provides:
An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in
section 9607 of this title must be commenced-
(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation
of physical on-site construction of the remedial action, except
that, if the remedial action is initiated within 3 years after the
completion of the removal action, costs incurred in the
removal action may be recovered in the cost recovery action
brought under this subparagraph.
Id.
"2 See id. § 9613(g)(2)(A). The difference between a remedial action and a removal action
lies in the nature of the cleanup action. Compare CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)
(defining "remove" and "removal"), with CERCLA § 101(24),. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)
(defining "remedy" and "remedial action").
"3 See, e.g., Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 679-81, 684-85
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); TH Agric. & Nutrition Co. v. Aceto Chem. Co., 884 F. Supp. 357, 359-62
(E.D. Cal. 1995). Regardless of what these cases may say with respect to liability under
section 113, Congress authorized courts to "allocate response costs among liable parties
using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1). Allocation based on equitable considerations is contradictory to several
liability only.
4 Frequently, some defendants will settle their liability prior to trial. As some defendants
settle, the issue arises regarding the appropriate credit rule to be applied to account for the
amounts for which liability has been settled. There are two possible methods for allocating
the response costs still owing after some, but not all, defendants negotiated settlements.
Courts can either apply the pro tanto allocation method adopted by section 2 of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA"), 12 U.L.A. 194, 246 (1996), and section
113(f)(2) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2), or the proportionate allocation method
adopted by section 2 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act ("UCFA"), 12 U.L.A. 126, 135-
36.
Under pro tanto allocation, defendants who refuse to settle prior to trial are held
jointly and severally liable for all remaining costs. When pro tanto allocation is used, the
defendants bear the settlement risk. Defending parties may elect to forego settlement and
[Vol. 21:300304
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places a greater burden on the plaintiff-PRP at trial. Finally, contribution
actions have a shorter, three-year statute of limitations which accrues upon
the occurrence of one of four liability-fixing events. 5
have their liability fully adjudicated. They bear the risk, however, that the negotiated
settlements will be lower than the settling defendants' collective fault. This results from
subtracting the settling defendants' settlement amounts from the plaintiffs' total damages,
not from subtracting the settling defendants' liability percentage. Therefore, non-settling
defendants could be found jointly and severally liable for the remainder of the damages not
settled, regardless of their actual collective percentage of fault. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763, 771 n.1 1 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
Under.proportionate allocation, all defendants' percentage of liability is determined
at trial, and each non-settling defendant can be held liable for no more than the percentage
attributable to them based on the determination at trial. The amount of settlements is
irrelevant in that each non-settling defendant pays only its percentage of liability, regardless
of the settlement amounts. The plaintiff bears the settlement risk under proportionate
allocation. If a plaintiff chooses to settle with a defendant, the plaintiff runs the risk that at
trial, the percentage of that settling party's liability will be deemed higher than the
percentage for which the plaintiff settled. Because the non-settling defendants will only be
liable for an amount the court determines, a non-settling defendant bears no risk when other
parties settle. As a result, plaintiffs and defendants are adverse to settlement, and trials
become longer and more complicated.
'5 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). That section pertinently provides:
No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be
commenced more than 3 years after-
(A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for
recovery of such costs or damages, or
(B) the date of an administrative order under section 9622(g) of
this title (relating to de minimis settlements) or 9622(h) of this title
(relating to cost recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially
approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.
Id.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
held that, where none of the express triggering events under section 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(g)(3), have occurred, such as where an alleged PRP cleans up a Superfund site based
on an EPA unilateral administrative order pursuant to section 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606, then
a "gap" exists in the statute of limitations which the court must fill in. See Sun Co. v.
Browning-Ferris, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1523 (N.D. Okla. 1996). In Sun Co., the court borrowed
statute of limitations analysis from admiralty jurisprudence and concluded that the statute
of limitations began running when plaintiffs paid more than their fair share of the costs of
cleaning up the Superfund site. See 919 F. Supp. at 1531. This ruling is inconsistent with
the express triggering events provided by Congress in section 11 3(g)(3), which all have in
common a concrete, liability-fixing event through adjudication or finalized settlement. See
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). Plaintiffs petitioned for and obtained interlocutory appeal to the
305.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
PRPs who have funded costly cleanups of Superfund sites prefer the
advantageous cost recovery action under section 107(a)(4)(B) over the more
restrictive contribution action under section 113(f). As such, the courts have
become the battleground for PRPs fighting for joint and several liability and
the longer statute of limitations in cost recovery actions against other PRPs.
Thus far, the courts have been inconsistent in resolving this seemingly
straightforward, but critically important, issue.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRP STANDING
UNDER SECTION 107(a) OF CERCLA
As originally enacted, CERCLA provided only one cause of
action-a cost recovery action under section 107(a). Courts concluded this
cause of action existed on behalf of PRPs who financed Superfund cleanups,
noting that under the plain language of CERCLA, PRPs are liable for all
response costs incurred by governmental entities or by "any other person" 6
who funded the cleanup.' 7 Courts held defendants jointly and severally liable
for the total cost of the Superfund cleanup. 8 Courts also found an implied
right of contribution in favor of the defendants in a section 107(a) action to
balance the inequities created when one or only a few PRPs were targeted in
the initial cost recovery action. 9
Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 198620 ("SARA"), which amended CERCLA, to clarify and confirm
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Sun Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., No. 96-
732 (10th Cir. Sept. 11, 1996). On appeal, the plaintiffs seek a ruling on the statute of
limitations issue consistent with Ekotek Site PRP Committee v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516,
1521-24 (D. Utah 1995), and Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Service, 901 F. Supp. 906,
914-15 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that because none of the four liability-fixing triggering
events had yet occurred, plaintiff s contribution action was not time-barred).
16 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
"7 See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1261-62 (D. Del.
1986); Pinole Point Properties v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Cal.
1984); United States v. Ward, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1235, 1238 (E.D.N.C. 1984); Jones
v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan
Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
I " See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 809-11 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
'9 See, e.g., County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (10th Cir. 1991).
20 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
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the judicially created right of contribution under CERCLA.2" Congress added
the right of contribution under section 113(f).22 Congress did not, however,
delineate the relationship between section 107(a) and section 113(). It is the
indistinct interplay between these two provisions that has caused problems
for courts confronting the issue of whether, in light of the 1986 amendments
to CERCLA, a PRP has standing to pursue a cost recovery action under
section 107(a). When CERCLA's provisions are read as a whole, in statutory
and historical context, it becomes clear that PRPs are permitted to pursue cost
recovery actions under section 107(a) in initial actions. Any other conclusion
rewrites CERCLA and seriously undermines the future effectiveness of
Superfund cleanups in the United States.
III. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF CERCLA PERMITS PRPs
TO PURSUE RESPONSE COSTS FROM OTHER PRPs
UNDER SECTION 107(a)(4)(B) OF CERCLA
A comprehensive and critical review of CERCLA's relevant
provisions leads to only one logical conclusion: where liability has not been
adjudicated with respect to a Superfund site, a PRP which cleaned up that site
can seek response costs from other PRPs under section 107(a) as an initial
action.
The relevant CERCLA language is clear and unambiguous when read
as a whole. CERCLA classifies four categories of persons as PRPs: (1)
current owners and operators of sites; (2) past owners or operators of sites;
(3) arrangers for the treatment or disposal of hazardous substances; and (4)
transporters of hazardous substances to disposal or treatment facilities.23
These four categories of PRPs are liable for: "(A) all costs of removal or
remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an
Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan; [and] (B) any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan. ' '2 4 Under the plain language of section
107(a)(4)(B), PRPs are liable for any necessary response costs incurred by
21 See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2861.
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0 (1994); see also supra note 5.
23 See id. § 9607(a).
24 1d.; see also supra note 4.
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"any other person" consistent with the NCP. 25 The term "person" is broadly
defined under CERCLA: "The term 'person' means an individual, firm,
corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial
entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body."26 There is no requirement in
the statute that "any other person" must be someone other than a PRP.
The "other" in the "any other person" language refers to persons other
than the United States government, states, or Indian tribes, to which PRPs are
liable for costs of removal or remedial actions under section 107(a)(4)(A).27
Courts have consistently held that the "other" does not mean non-PRPs.
2s
PRPs are liable to "the United Sates Government or a State or an Indian
tribe" for "costs of removal or remedial action" under section 107(a)(4)(A).29
Pursuant to section 107(a)(4)(B), however, PRPs are liable to "any other
person" who incurred "any other necessary costs of response" consistent with
the NCP.3 ° "Any other person" refers to some person other than the United
States government, states, or Indian tribes, rather than to a person other than
a PRP.
Based on the plain language of CERCLA, a PRP is liable to any
person who incurs response costs consistent with the NCP.3' Incurring
response costs which are consistent with the NCP are the only two conditions
placed on a plaintiffs right to seek response costs under section 107(a).
"[T]he test as to whether a private party may utilize Section 107 does not rest
on whether that party is liable, or potentially liable. Rather, it depends on
whether such party has incurred 'necessary costs of response.'" 3 2 Adding an
"innocent" element to the liability scheme "adds needless confusion to the
determination of who may utilize Section 107. It involves the Court in
predicting, prior to trial, whether a party may also share liability with
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
26 Id. § 9601(21).
27 See id. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
28 See, e.g., Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 580 (D. Conn.
1994); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 404-05 (W.D. Mo.
1985).
29 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
30 Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
3' See id.
32 United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355, 362-63 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (concluding that
nongovernmental PRPs could seek response costs from other PRPs under section 107(a))
(footnote omitted).
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defendants for the environmental cleanup. '33 Even if a party's liability for
hazardous substances at a site is undisputed, that party's ability to seek
response costs from other PRPs is not limited to contribution actions under
the plain language of CERCLA.
IV. RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF CERCLA HAVE NOT
CONSISTENTLY PERMITTED PRPs TO PURSUE COST RECOVERY
UNDER SECTION 107(a)(4)(B) OF CERCLA
A common theme emerges upon a close review of the body of case
law that has confronted PRP standing under section 107(a). A PRP is
permitted to pursue cost recovery actions under section 107(a) if that PRP
cleaned up a Superfund site without an adjudication of liability and
subsequently, in an initial action, seeks to recover the costs expended in
cleaning up the site. Where there has been an adjudication, however, the
action truly sounds in contribution and should be brought under section
113(f).
Two lines of case law support this interpretation of CERCLA. The
first line of case law comes from those cases which have allowed PRPs to
seek response costs from other PRPs under section 107(a) when there has not
been a prior "civil action."34 The second line of case law comes from those
cases which have limited PRPs to contribution actions when the PRP's claim
33 Id. at 363-64.
14 See, e.g., Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994); County Line
Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v.
Atlas Properties, Inc., 901 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1990); Tanglewood East Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco,
Inc., 792 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1986); AM Properties Corp. v. GTE Prods. Corp., 844 F. Supp.
1007 (D.N.J. 1994); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D.
Conn. 1994); Barton Solvents, Inc. v. Southwest Petro-Chem, Inc., 38 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1022 (D. Kan. 1993); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814
F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992); Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F.
Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Sand Springs Home v. I.terplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913
(N.D. Okla. 1987). But see United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995);
United States v. SCA Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (permitting
a PRP to seek response costs from other PRPs despite the fact that a prior "civil action" had
been asserted).
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was preceded by a "civil action" under sections 106 or 107, where liability
with respect to the Superfund site had been adjudicated.35
No inconsistency exists in grouping these cases based upon this
method of analysis.3 6 Rather, a common theme emerges. If a "civil action"
has. been filed by any governmental or private party (whether or not such
party is a PRP) which results in an adjudication of liability, then a PRP can
only seek reimbursement through contribution under section 113(f).
However, where no "civil action" has been filed and there has been no
adjudication of liability, a PRP can seek response costs in an initial civil
action under section 107(a). Any defendant-PRP in this initial action will be
limited to a contribution action against any other PRP, including the plaintiff-
PRP, pursuant to section 113(f).
This interpretation gives meaning to the language of the statute of
limitations provision in section 11 3(g)(2) that "[a]n initial action for recovery
of costs referred to in section 9607... must be commenced ... for a remedial
action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site construction of the
remedial action. '37 Actions by PRPs other than the "initial" action are
contribution actions subject to the three-year statute of limitations of section
113(g)(3). 31
A. The United States Supreme Court Impliedly Permits PRPs to Pursue Cost
Recovery Actions Against Other PRPs Under Section 107(a)
In Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,39 the U.S. Supreme Court
impliedly ruled that one PRP could seek response costs from another PRP
under section 107(a) where there had been no prior initial action as to those
costs." The Supreme Court concluded that "[section] 107 unquestionably
"5 See, e.g., United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 721 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1989); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F. Supp.
1027 (D. Mass. 1989).
36 But see Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp.
1231, 1241 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that "[t]he contradictory outcomes appear to derive
more from two differing interpretations of CERCLA, its policy goals, and the proper means
of effectuating those goals, than from factual distinctions in the cases").
' 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
38 Id. § 9613(g)(3); see also supra note 15.
39 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
40 See id. at 811.
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provides a cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup
costs" in a suit where one PRP had sued other PRPs for cost recovery under
section 107(a).4
In Key Tronic, various lawsuits arose out of a Superfund site cleanup,
including formal proceedings against Key Tronic, the United States Air
Force, and other parties.42 Two of those proceedings concluded in
settlements.43 In one settlement with EPA, Key Tronic agreed to contribute
$4.2 million to an EPA cleanup fund.44 In the other settlement with EPA, the
Air Force agreed to pay EPA $1.45 million.45
Key Tronic subsequently brought suit pursuant to section
107(a)(4)(B), seeking $1.2 million for response costs that it incurred before,
and were not part of, the settlements.46 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the
relevant issue was whether Key Tronic, a PRP,47 was entitled to recover
attorneys' fees as part of "response costs" under section 107(a).48 The
Supreme Court had to resolve the attorneys' fees issue in the context of a suit
by one PRP against another PRP seeking response costs under section
107(a)(4)(B).
The Supreme Court concluded that one PRP could sue other PRPs
under section 107(a)(4)(B) to seek response costs where those response costs
were incurred before, and independently of, any settlements. 49 The Court
concluded that the 1986 amendments supported the pre-amendment cases
which permitted a PRP to seek response costs under section 107(a) from
other PRPs.5 0 The majority opinion stated section 107(a) "unquestionably"
provides a private cause of action by a PRP.5 Hence, response costs incurred
before a CERCLA initial action are not part of a civil action referred to in
41 Id. at 818.




46 See id. at 812.
41 See id. at 813.
48 See id.
41 See id. at 819.
'0 See id. at 816.
"' Id. at 818. The majority concluded that the private right of action on behalf of PRPs
was implicit under section 107(a). See id. at 818 n. 11. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Blackmun and Thomas, dissenting on the attorneys' fees issue, stated that section 107(a)
expressly provides a private cause of action that extends to PRPs. See id. at 821.
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section 113(f)(1) and, therefore, recovery of those costs is not limited to a
contribution action. 2
B. The Circuit Courts of Appeals Actually Confronting the Issue of Whether
PRPs Can Pursue Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107(a) Have Been
Few and Inconsistent
Some circuit courts of appeals have concluded that PRPs cannot seek
response costs under section 107(a). There is no clear majority, however, in
the circuit courts denying PRP standing under section 107(a). Indeed, the
number of circuit courts to squarely confront this issue is minimal.
Numerous circuit courts of appeals53 have issued opinions which
seemingly confront the issue of PRP standing under section 107(a): General
Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc. ;54 Control Data
Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp.;" Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco, Inc.;56 United
States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.;57 Bancamerica Commercial
Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kansas, Inc.;58 In re Dant & Russell, Inc. v.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co.;59 United Technologies Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.;6 Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.; 61
52 See id. at 816.
s The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet addressed this issue.
Consequently, the district court opinions in that circuit have reached inconsistent
conclusions. Compare Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, 915 F. Supp. 1290, 1314
(W.D.N.Y. 1996), and Town of Wallkill v. Tesa Tape Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (holding that PRPs may pursue cost recovery actions under section 107(a)), with
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that PRPs are limited to contribution actions under section 113(f)). Likewise, neither the
Fourth Circuit nor the Eleventh Circuit have issued opinions dealing with the issue of PRP
standing under section 107(a). But see notes 235-41 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the district court opinions from the Fourth Circuit confronting this issue.
54 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990); see infra Part IV.B.1.
55 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995); see infra Part IV.B.2.
56 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 1993); see infra Part IV.B.3.
11 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); see infra Part IV.B.4.
58 100 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 1996); see infra Part IV.B.5.
59 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991); see infra Part IV.B.6.
60 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995); see infra Part IV.B.7.
61 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); see infra Part IV.B.8.
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Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp. ;62 Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. ;63
and Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.' Each opinion will
be discussed separately. As will be shown, the authority which actually
supports the proposition that PRPs can only seek contribution under section
113(f) is minimal.
1. General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc.
In General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems,
Inc.,6 5 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, without confronting the
issue head on, permitted a PRP to pursue a cost recovery action under section
107(a). Litton's predecessor in interest operated a typewriter plant on a site
in Missouri.66 As part of that plant process, cyanide-based electroplating
wastes, sludge, and other pollutants were dumped on the plant site.67 Litton
eventually closed down the plant and sold the property to General Electric
("GE"). 8  The Missouri Department of Natural Resources ("MDNR")
learned of the hazardous substances at the site and notified GE.69 MDNR and
GE concluded that there was no potential for ground water contamination and
performed no cleanup of the site.7" GE thereafter sold the contaminated
portion of the property to Enterprise Park without disclosing the
contamination at the property.71 Subsequently MDNR changed course and
pursued the cleanup of the site.72 GE, as the former owner of the site,
conducted the cleanup following a threat of a lawsuit by Enterprise Park
based on GE's failure to disclose the condition of the property.73 Upon
completion of the cleanup, GE filed a cost recovery action pursuant to section
107(a).74
62 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993); see infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
63 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989); see infra Part IV.B.9.
6 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988); see infra Part IV.B.10.
65 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990).







71 See id. at 1417-18.
74 See id. at 1417.
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The court permitted the section 107(a) action by GE, a former
landowner and thus a PRP, against Litton.75 Litton raised the defense of
unclean hands, claiming that GE's motivation for cleaning up the site was the
threat of a lawsuit by Enterprise Park.76 Rejecting the unclean hands defense
to CERCLA liability, the court held:
[T]he motives of the private party attempting to recoup
response costs under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) are irrelevant.
The purpose of allowing a private party to recover its
response costs is to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. This purpose would be frustrated if a plaintiff's
motives were subject to question. We will not look at the
impetus behind a plaintiffs decision to begin the cleanup
process; we will look only to see if there has been a release or
threatened release for which the defendant is responsible.77
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit permitted a cost recovery action under section
107(a) by one PRP against another PRP, concluding that such an action was
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA.
2. Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp.
In Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp.,78 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit again did not squarely confront the issue of whether a PRP
may pursue a cost recovery action under section 107(a).79 In Control Data,
a PRP entered into a consent decree with a state governmental agency
7 See id. at 1418.
76 See id. at 1417-18.
77 Id. at 1418.
7- 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995).
" See Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624, 630 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (noting that the Eighth Circuit in Control Data did not address the issue of PRP
standing under section 107(a)). The inconsistency of the Eighth Circuit's opinions in
Control Data and General Electric has led to inconsistent district court opinions within that
circuit. Compare Laidlaw Waste Sys., 925 F. Supp. 624 (holding that PRPs may assert cost
recovery claims under section 107(a)), with Reynolds Metals Co. v. Arkansas Power & Light
Co., 920 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Ark. 1996) (stating that PRPs are limited to contribution claims
under section 113(f)).
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agreeing to clean up a hazardous substance contamination."0 Subsequently,
that PRP sued another PRP for response costs under CERCLA and
Minnesota's state law equivalent."' The trial court allocated the costs of
remediating the site between the two PRPs and awarded the plaintiff-PRP
attorneys' fees. 2 On appeal, the defendant-PRP challenged the method of
allocation and the award of attorneys' fees. 3
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, 4 holding generally that
once liability is established, the issue becomes one of allocation, which
entails a contribution claim controlled by section 113(f). 5 The opinion
contains no other discussion of the balance or interplay between sections
107(a) and 113(f), nor the competing interests presented when deciding
whether PRPs should be permitted to pursue cost recovery actions under
section 107(a). The opinion does not squarely confront the issue of PRP
standing under section 107(a).
Control Data does not support the proposition that one PRP may
never pursue a cost recovery action against other PRPs under section 107(a).
The decision is consistent with the theory behind the two line of cases
suggested above: a cost recovery action is permitted by a PRP as an initial
action; however, "[o]nce liability is established, the focus shifts to
'o See Control Data, 53 F.3d at 933. The site had been contaminated with 1,1,1
trichloroethane ("TCA") and tetrachloroethylene ("PERC"). See id. at 932. Control Data
had deposited the TCA at the site, but claimed that it was not responsible for the PERC
contamination. See id. at 933. After Control Data denied any responsibility for the PERC,
the state environmental agency searched for other contributors. See id. It located S.C.S.C.
Corporation, a successor in interest to a corporation which deposited the PERC at the site.
See id.
SI See id. at 932; see also Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 115B.01-.51 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997). It is unclear from the
opinion whether the plaintiff alleged a cause of action for cost recovery or contribution, or
both.
' See Control Data, 53 F.3d at 932. Even though the defendant-PRP contributed 10% of
the chemical contamination, the trial court allocated one-third of the liability to the
defendant-PRP because the chemical that PRP contributed to the site was more toxic than
the chemical contributed to the site by the plaintiff-PRP. See id. at 933.
" See id. The trial court awarded attorney fees under CERCLA and the state equivalent.
See id.
" See id. at 939. The court of appeals reversed that portion of the attorneys' fees award
under CERCLA, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Key Tronic. See id.
" See id. at 935.
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allocation," 6 and the only cause of action available at that juncture is
contribution under section 113(f). In Control Data, the liability of the
plaintiff-PRP with respect to the site had previously been adjudicated, as
evidenced by the fact that the PRP had entered into a consent decree with the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 7 and the fact that the court turned to
allocation only after noting that "liability [had been] established." 8 Control
Data does not support the proposition that a PRP can only sue other PRPs for
contribution under section 113(f).
3. Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco, Inc.
Similarly, in Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco, Inc.,8 9 without
squarely confronting this issue, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
permitted one PRP to seek response costs from other PRPs under section
107(a).9" Velsicol and other hazardous substance contributors cleaned up a
municipal landfill at the insistence of the EPA.9' Subsequently, Velsicol sued
other PRPs for recovery of response costs under section 107(a), and for
contribution under section 113(0.92 The district court granted summary
86 Id.
17 See id. at 933. The Court noted that Control Data, the plaintiff-PRP, had entered into
a consent decree that required Control Data to investigate, monitor, and clean up the
contamination by installing a remediation system to remove the hazardous contaminants.
See id.
88 Id. at 935. The court did not analyze the issue further, other than merely to note that
liability had been established. See id.
89 9 F.3d 524 (6th Cir 1993).
The Sixth Circuit's lack of clear guidance on this issue has led to conflicting decisions
among the district courts in that circuit. Two of those district courts have ruled that persons
who incur response costs may assert a cause of action under section 107(a) regardless of that
person's status as a PRP. See Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, Inc., 914
F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Ky. 1995); Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co.,
910 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Mich. 1995). Four other district court opinions have reached the
opposite conclusion, limiting PRPs to contribution actions under section 113(f). See
Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., No. 1:94CV1588 (N.D. Ohio Sept.
13, 1996); Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 917 F. Supp. 1173 (N.D. Ohio 1996);
AT&T Global Info. Solutions Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., No. 2:94-876, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8167 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 1996); Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,
904 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
9' See Velsicol, 9 F.3d at 526.
92 See id. at 527.
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judgment for Enenco on both claims, concluding that Velsicol's cost recovery
action was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches.93
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the
statute of limitations did not apply retroactively and that there were no
equitable defenses, such as laches, to CERCLA liability.94 Thus, the
appellate court reinstated Velsicol's cost recovery action under section
107(a).95 Therefore, despite Velsicol's status as a PRP, Velsicol was
permitted to pursue a cost recovery action under section 107(a).96
4. United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.
Similarly, United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co.97 does
not support the proposition that a PRP may never pursue a cost recovery
action under section 107(a). Rather, Colorado & Eastern stands for the
limited proposition that once the EPA obtains a judgment in a civil action
adjudicating a PRP's liability, that PRP may not sue other PRPs for cost
3 See id.
9 See id. at 530. The Sixth Circuit commented that CERCLA liability is barred only "by
a limited number of enumerated causation-based affirmative defenses." Id. The defenses
listed in section 107(a) constitute the "universe of defenses" to CERCLA liability. Id. (citing
General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir.
1990)).
" See id. The district court also dismissed Velsicol's section 113(g) contribution claim
because that claim was dependant upon a valid cost recovery claim under section 107(a).
See id. at 527. In reinstating Velsicol's cost recovery claim, the appellate court also
reinstated Velsicol's contribution claim. See id. at 531.
96 See id. The Sixth Circuit is presented with the opportunity to squarely confront the
issue of PRP standing under section 107(a) in Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron &
Metal Corp., where the plaintiffs recently petitioned the court for interlocutory appeal
following the district court's certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994). See
Petition for Permission to Appeal, Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.,
No. 1:94CV 1588 (N.D. Ohio filed Dec. 13, 1996). The Sixth Circuit granted interlocutory
appeal on February 13, 1997. Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., No.
96-8342 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1997).
W 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995).
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recovery under section 107(a), but instead, may only sue for contribution
under section 113(f).98
In Colorado & Eastern, EPA sued four PRPs-Farmland, McKesson,
Colorado & Eastern Railroad Co. ("CERC"), and Maytag-seeking response
costs under section 107(a).99 As a result of EPA's suit, Farmland and
McKesson entered into a judicially approved consent decree, thereby
agreeing to finance and perform all remediation of the site and to pay a
portion of EPA's past response costs.'0° Farmland and McKesson completed
the remediation at a cost in excess of $15 million.'"' That figure included
money spent for additional remediation work made necessary because CERC
made a cut in a drainage ditch, and because CERC failed to fence portions of
the site.° 2
In EPA's initial cost recovery suit, all four defendants asserted cross-
claims against each other.'0 3 Farmland asserted a cross-claim against CERC
seeking a portion of the additional remediation costs caused by CERC's
actions at the site." All of the defendants' cross-claims were settled before
trial except Farmland's cross-claim against CERC. 0 5 Therefore, after the
court adjudicated liability and entered judgment for the EPA, the only
remaining issue was CERC's liability to Farmland for a portion of the
additional remediation costs.0 6
Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
concluded that Farmland's claim against CERC was really a contribution
9 At least three district courts in the Tenth Circuit have interpreted Colorado & Eastern
to support the proposition that PRPs do not have standing to pursue cost recovery actions
under section 107(a). See Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1523, 1528-30
(N.D. Okla. 1996); Johnson County Airport Comm'n v. Parsonitt Co., 916 F. Supp. 1090,
1092-95 (D. Kan. 1996); Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (D. Utah
1995). The Sun Co. decision is currently on interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit,
challenging the district court's interpretation of Colorado & Eastern and a statute of
limitations issue. See Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., No. 96-732 (10th Cir. Sept. 11,
1996) (granting interlocutory appeal).
99 See Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1533.
'0o See id.
101 See id.
'02 See id. at 1533 n.1.
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claim under section 113(f). 117 Because the judicially approved consent decree
was for all remedial work, it included the additional remedial work for which
Farmland sought reimbursement from CERC.° 8 Therefore, the court held
that Farmland could not seek response costs under section 107(a), but rather,
was limited to a section 113(f) action. 9  Tellingly, in Colorado &
Eastern the court did not cite to any of the case law available at that time
which limited a PRP to contribution actions based on the PRPs' status as a
PRP. Rather, the court based its decision on the unique facts presented: a
PRP seeking response costs from other PRPs following a prior adjudication
of liability with respect to a Superfund site.
The principle to be derived from Colorado & Eastern is that, where
there has been an "initial action" which is a civil action, a PRP seeking
response costs is limited to a contribution action. If a civil action, such as a
section 107(a) action, is filed by any person, then a defendant-PRP can only
seek reimbursement from other PRPs through contribution. However, where
no prior civil action has been filed, a PRP can seek reimbursement through
section 107(a) as an "initial action."
At least one district court opinion has criticized Colorado & Eastern
for ignoring Key Tronic."° However, the factual and procedural distinctions
between Colorado & Eastern and Key Tronic are such that the two cases can
easily be reconciled within the context of permitting PRPs to pursue cost
recovery actions under section 107(a), unless there has been some other
initial action.
In Colorado & Eastern, a defendant-PRP in a section 107(a) civil
action sought response costs from another defendant-PRP for additional
remediation work conducted as part of the consent decree entered in that
suit."' Because there was a prior civil action covering the costs the plaintiff-
PRP sought, that PRP's action against the defendant-PRP was truly a
contribution action. In Key Tronic, however, the plaintiff-PRP sought
response costs from the defendant-PRP which the plaintiff-PRP had incurred
before settlement with the EPA, and which costs were not part of EPA's
107 See id. at 1536.
108 See id.
'o See id.
1o See, e.g., Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 910 F. Supp. 332,
336 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
.. See Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1533.
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section 107(a) action or the consent decree arising as a result of that action.112
In Key Tronic, because the response costs were incurred independently of the
consent decree and before the civil action by EPA, the plaintiff-PRP was
permitted to pursue cost recovery against the defendant-PRP under section
107(a)." 13
5. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kansas, Inc.
In Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kansas, Inc.,114
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit wrote dicta which seemingly
supports the proposition that a PRP should be limited to a contribution action
under section 113(f)."' Upon a closer review, however, Bancamerica does
not support limiting PRP standing to section 113(0, and is, in fact, consistent
with the delineation of the two lines of cases discussed in this article. In
Bancamerica, liability with respect to the Superfund site had been
adjudicated, as evidenced by the consent decree." 6  Under these
circumstances, when Bancamerica sought costs it had incurred at the site for
which it had settled its liability, the claim was a "quintessential claim for
contribution."'' 7
6. In re Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.
In In re Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,"1
8
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt indirectly with the PRP
standing issue in the context of a bankruptcy matter. Burlington Northern
Railroad ("BNR") filed a claim against the bankruptcy estate of Dant &
Russell ("D&R")." 9 BNR sought recovery of cleanup costs incurred and
12 See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 813 (1994).
..3 See id. at 819.
114 100 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 1996).
"I See id. at 800-01.
1 6 .See id. at 795.
I7 d. at 800 (quoting United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536, 1538
(10th Cir. 1995)).
118 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991).
19 See id. at 247.
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expected'2° under section 107(a) based on an EPA order for a site owned by
BNR and leased to D&R.12' The bankruptcy court awarded all costs
requested by BNR against the bankruptcy estate.1
22
On appeal, the sole issue before the court was the bankruptcy court's
award of future cleanup costs. 123 D&R claimed that the future costs award
should have been disallowed pursuant to section 502(e)(1)(B) of the
Bankruptcy Code.'24 The court began its analysis by noting that a claim
against a bankruptcy estate will only be disallowed under section
502(e)(1)(B) where: (1) the claim is for reimbursement or contribution; (2)
the party asserting the claim is liable with the debtor on the claim; and (3) the
claim is contingent. 25 The court concluded that BNR's claim failed to satisfy
the second co-liability requirement, and therefore it allowed BNR's claim
against the bankruptcy estate.126
In so holding, the court acknowledged that it is well settled that
section 107(a) "permits a private party to recover from a responsible party
response costs it incurs itself in conducting cleanup pursuant to
CERCLA-even absent intervention by the state."' 27 Permitting private
actions encourages quick, voluntary remediation of environmental hazards.
28
120 BNR sought a total of $14,235,700 from D&R. See id. Only about $1 million of that
amount had actually been expended by BNR at the time it filed its claim in the bankruptcy
action. See id.
12, See id. D&R operated the leased premises as a wood treatment plant from 1971 to
1983. See id. Previous tenants on the property similarly had used the premises for wood
treatment. See id. D&R filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 in 1982. See id.
122 See id.
,23 See id.
124 See id. Section 502(e)(1) provides:
[T]he court shall disallow any claim for reimbursement or contribution of
an entity that is liable with the debtor on or has secured, the claim of a
creditor, to the extent that-
(B) such claim for reimbursement or contribution is contingent
as of the time of allowance or disallowance of such claim for
reimbursement or contribution ....
11 U.S.C. § 502(e)(1) (1994).
125 See Dant & Russell, 951 F.2d at 248 (citation omitted).
126 See id.
127 Id. (citing Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986)).
128 See id.
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The court's language indicates a broad interpretation of CERCLA to further
public policy goals of quickly cleaning up hazardous substances.
Despite this public policy statement, however, it is possible to read
Dant & Russell as narrowing the court's interpretation of CERCLA. This
narrowing. occurred when the court indicated that section 113(f) applied
because: (1) BNR admitted CERCLA liability; (2) D&R's action was a civil
action under section 107(a); and (3) D&R argued that BNR should contribute
to the cleanup costs. 29
The Dant & Russell opinion is confusing. It is impossible to predict,
based on Dant & Russell, whether the Ninth Circuit, when squarely
confronted with the issue, will permit a PRP to pursue a cost recovery action
under section 107(a). 30 Indeed, other courts have acknowledged that the
Dant & Russell opinion is unclear, noting that "[c]ourts have read this
opinion as both endorsing and prohibiting a PRP cost recovery action."13'
129 See id. at 249.
"'
30 The lack of clarity provided by the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dant & Russell has led
to inconsistent district court opinions within that circuit. Compare Pinal Creek Group v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Ariz. 1996), and Transportation Leasing Co.
v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that PRPs may assert cost recovery
actions under section 107(a)), with Boyce v. Bumb, 944 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Cal. 1996), and
TH Agric. & Nutrition Co. v. Aceto Chem. Co., 884 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (stating
that PRPs are limited to claims for contribution under section 113(f)). The opportunity to
clarify the issue of PRP standing under section 107(a) in the Ninth Circuit is currently before
the court. National Am. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. BPJ Int'l, No. CV-92-2818-WMB (C.D.
Cal. May 10, 1995), interlocutory appeal docketed, No. 95-56734 (9th Cir. Dec. 8, 1995);
see also Pinal Creek, 926 F. Supp. at 1403 n.3. Briefing has been completed and oral
arguments were held on Thursday, December 12, 1996. A decision by that Court is expected
soon.
13' Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231, 1245
n.16 (M.D. Pa. 1996). The court instructed:
Compare Pinal Creek Group, 926 F. Supp. at 1412-13 (finding that Dant
& Russell "appears to support Plaintiffs' argument that PRPs have
standing to assert Section 107 cost recovery claims"), with Akzo
[Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.], 30 F.3d at 761 [(7th Cir. 1994)] (citing
Dant & Russell for the proposition that CERCLA claims brought by liable
parties are "quintessential" contribution claims).
Id. Ultimately, the court in Adhesives Research declined to speculate about the Ninth
Circuit's opinion, but rather preferred to wait until that court clarified the issue itself. See
id.; see also Boyce v. Bumb, 944 F. Supp. 807, 811-12 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting that the
Ninth Circuit's "position on the relationship between § 9607(a) and § 9613(f)(1) is not
entirely clear").
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7. United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.
In United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.,
United Technologies Corporation ("UTC") and other PRPs cleaned up a
Superfund landfill site pursuant to a judicially approved consent decree.'33
EPA placed the landfill on the NPL in 1981 after discovering hazardous
substance contaminants at the site. 134 Through an investigation with state
authorities, EPA discovered that Inmont Corporation, a company acquired by
UTC, had operated and contaminated the site from 1950 to 1975.131 In 1982,
EPA notified Inmont that it was liable for the cleanup of the site. 36 Inmont
and other PRPs negotiated and agreed to settlements with EPA and drafted
a consent decree.' 37 EPA then filed a section 107(a) action against Inmont
and these other PRPs, and EPA obtained judicial approval of the consent
decree. 13  Under the judicially approved consent decree, UTC and other
PRPs agreed to complete the cleanup of the site and reimburse the federal and
state governments $475,000 for costs previously incurred with respect to
treatment of the site. 139
More than five years after the court approved the consent decree,
UTC and others sued several other PRPs to recover response costs. 14 UTC
sought cost recovery under section 107(a) and contribution under section
1 13(f).' 4 1 The defendants sought summary judgment, claiming that UTC's
claims were time-barred. 42 Defendants argued that plaintiffs, as PRPs, were
limited to contribution claims under CERCLA, 14 3 and that the plaintiffs'
contribution claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations
in section 113(g)(3).144
132 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995).









142 See id. at 98.
143 See id.
4 See id.
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The district court accepted defendants' argument. 45 The trial court
concluded that a PRP which has settled its liability with respect to a site is
limited in its own future recovery to a contribution action under section
113(f). 146 Because UTC had settled its liability with the government, UTC
was limited to a contribution action. 147 That contribution action, however,
was time-barred. 1
48
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the trial court's
decision, but using a different rationale. 149 The court noted that its first
recourse in statutory construction was to the statute's text and structure. 50
With that canon as its starting point, the court concluded that it was "sensible
to assume that Congress intended only innocent parties-not parties who
were themselves liable-to be permitted to recoup the whole of their
expenditures."'' A "non-innocent" party on the other hand is only entitled
to recoup "that portion of his expenditures which exceeds his pro rata share
of the overall liability."'1
52
The court concluded that the term "contribution" in section 113(f) was
a "standard legal term that enjoys a stable, well-known denotation."' 53 The
court defined "contribution" as an action "by and between jointly and
severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment-one of them
has been compelled to make."' 54 Because UTC's cause of action fit within
that definition of contribution, UTC's cost recovery action was a contribution
action under section 113(f) rather than a cost recovery action under section
107(a). 55 UTC's contribution action was thus subject to the restrictive three-
year statute of limitations in section 113(g)(3), and was therefore untimely.
1 56
141 See United Techs. Corp. v. Browning Ferris Indus., No. 92-0206-B, 1993 WL 660007,
at *5 (D. Me. May 27, 1993).
146 See id. at *4.
117 See id. at *5.
148 See id.
141 See United Techs., 33 F.3d at 103 n.13.
"0 See id. at 99.
"I' Id. at 100.
152 Id.
153 Id.
'5 Id. (quoting Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994)).
'5 See id. at 103.
156 See id.
[Vol. 21:300324
1997] THE EVOLUTION OF PRP STANDING UNDER CERCLA
Interestingly, the court rejected an interpretation of the relevant
provisions offered by UTC 157 because UTC's proffered interpretation would,
the court said, rewrite CERCLA.'58 The court's interpretation of CERCLA,
on the other hand, supposedly left the unqualified language of CERCLA
intact "as Congress wrote it, that is without qualification.' 5' To the contrary,
the court rewrote CERCLA to include an "innocent" qualification in the
liability section, where no such qualification exists, but noted later that it
should not rewrite CERCLA with respect to the scope of incurred costs."6°
8. Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.
In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp.,6' the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that a PRP's action against another PRP is an action for
contribution under section 113(f) rather than a cost recovery action under
section 107(a).'62 There, EPA issued a unilateral administrative order under
section 106 of CERCLA, compelling Akzo Coatings Corporation to clean up
the Fisher-Calo site in Indiana. 63  Akzo Coatings complied with the
unilateral administrative order, incurring cleanup costs in excess of $1.2
million. 6 In 1990, EPA issued a Record of Decision ("ROD") covering
areas including, but not limited to, the area cleaned up by Akzo Coatings. 65
EPA negotiated and finalized settlements with more than 200 PRPs to
'5 UTC argued that the phrase "incurred by" in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) meant that section
107(a) "only cover[ed] actions to recoup cleanup costs directly paid (i.e., 'incurred') by a
responsible party," as opposed to the reimbursement of costs some other entity paid in
conducting the cleanup. Id. at 101.
' See id. at 102.
159 Id.
" Undoubtedly, the interpretation UTC proffered would have rewritten CERCLA. Such
judicial legislation should not occur. However, the court wholly failed to acknowledge that
its interpretation of the relationship between sections 107(a) and 113(f) likewise rewrote
CERCLA by imposing an "innocence" requirement on PRPs pursuing a cost recovery action.
See id. at 100.
161 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
162 See id. at 764.
163 See id. at 762. The Fisher-Calo site refers to various hazardous waste facilities within
the Kingsbury Industrial Park in Kingsbury, Indiana. See id. More than 200 businesses
generated hazardous wastes that were sent to the Fisher-Calo site between 1972 and 1985.
See id.
"6 See id. at 762-63.
165 See id. at 763.
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implement the cleanup outlined in the ROD. 166 In December 1991, EPA filed
suit against those settling PRPs, seeking and obtaining judicial approval of
the proposed consent decree.1 6' The judicially approved consent decree
included Aigner Corporation, but not Akzo Coatings.'68
Akzo Coatings subsequently filed a CERCLA action against
Aigner. 169  Akzo Coatings sought a portion of the costs it incurred in
conducting the initial cleanup work performed pursuant to the unilateral
administrative order. 17' Aigner sought dismissal of Akzo Coatings'
complaint because it sought recovery of matters addressed by the judicially
approved consent decree. 171 The district court granted summary judgment for
Aigner. 172
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded the case to the district court. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
Akzo Coatings' claim was one for contribution. 173 In so ruling, the court
acknowledged that "it is true that section 107(a) permits any 'person'-not
just the federal or state governments-to seek recovery of appropriate costs
incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site." 174 Such standing under
section 107(a), however, was implicitly restricted by the court to innocent
PRPs, such as "a landowner forced to clean up hazardous materials that a
third party spilled onto its property or that migrated there from adjacent
lands. 1 75 The court imposed this "innocent" requirement on PRP standing
under section 107(a), noting that a party which is liable for a portion of the
hazardous substance contamination at a site is actually seeking to have its
response costs equitably apportioned between itself and other PRPs.1 76 "That
is the quintessential claim for contribution."1 77 CERCLA's contribution
provision confirmed this "innocent" requirement, the court held, by












177 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979)).
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"permitting a firm to seek contribution from 'any other' party liable under
sections 106 or 107.""' Because Akzo Coatings was itself a liable party
under CERCLA, the court restricted Akzo Coatings to a contribution
action. 179
Despite this ruling, other courts have criticized the Seventh Circuit for
not reconciling its ruling in Akzo Coatings with its ruling less than one year
earlier in Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp. '80 In Amcast, the Seventh
Circuit recognized that section 107(a) "permits one responsible person to
recover all or part of its response costs from another."'' This inconsistency
within the Seventh Circuit has yet to be explained by that court.
9. Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.
In Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. ,182 Amoco brought a private action
to recover projected response costs to clean up radioactive phosphogypsum
wastes at a property it purchased from Borden.183 The phosphogypsum was
a by-product of a phosphate fertilizer plant operated on the property by
Borden. 184 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not squarely
confront the issue of whether Borden, as an owner-PRP, may pursue a cost
recovery action under section 107(a) against other PRPs.185 The court did,
however, note that the hazard on the property constituted an "indivisible
harm."' 86  Since Amoco owned a facility that continued to release a
hazardous substance, Amoco shared joint and several liability for remedial
actions.'87 Without further explanation, the court proceeded to note that
"[w]hen one liable party sues another to recover its equitable share of the
response costs, the action is one for contribution, which is specifically
178 Id. (emphasis added).
179 See id.
18o 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
181 Id. at 748.
182 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1990).
181 See id. at 666.
184 See id.
185 See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1411 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (noting that the Fifth Circuit in Amoco Oil "merely endorsed the application of
Section 113(f) in discussing the allocation of cleanup costs among the parties").
186 Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 672 (citing United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171
(4th Cir. 1988)).
187 See id.
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recognized under CERCLA."' 8 The court did not otherwise discuss the
public policy behind permitting PRPs to pursue cost recovery actions under
section 107(a).
10. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.
In Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp.,"9 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit did not squarely confront the issue of whether
a PRP could pursue cost recovery under section 107(a). 190 There, one PRP
sought response costs from another PRP.'9 The plaintiff-PRP cleaned up the
hazardous substance site after being informed by EPA that if it did not take
corrective action, the government would perform the work and then seek
reimbursement.'92 After the cleanup, plaintiff sought costs from defendant-
PRPs who had created and deposited the hazardous substance at the site.'93
It is unclear from the opinion whether the plaintiff-PRP was pursuing such
costs under section 107(a) or section 113(f). The court proceeded under
section 113();'94 the opinion contained no discussion, however, regarding the
issue of whether a PRP can pursue a cost recovery action under section
107(a).
188 Id.
189 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
"9 The lack of guidance provided by the Third Circuit in Smith Land & Improvement
Corp. has led to inconsistent district court opinions within that circuit. Compare Adhesives
Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D. Pa. 1996), and
Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding
that PRPs may assert cost recovery claims under section 107(a)), with Borough of Sayreville
v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671 (D.N.J. 1996), and Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery
& Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Pa. 1995), and Transtech Indus. v. A & Z Septic
Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079 (D.N.J. 1992) (stating that PRPs are limited to contribution claims
under section 113(o).
... Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 87.
392 See id.
9 See id. at 88.
t See id. at 88-89.
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V. THE RECENT TREND OF DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS PERMITS PRPs TO
PURSUE COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 107(a)
BASED ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
The recent trend among federal district courts permits PRPs to pursue
cost recovery actions under section 107(a).' The district court opinions base
their conclusion on the plain language of CERCLA, and do not require an
analysis based on whether liability has been adjudicated with respect to a
Superfund site.' 96
19' See, e.g., Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp.
1231, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (agreeing with "a growing body of case law" which holds that
the "any other person" language of section 107(a)(4)(B) confers standing on any person who
incurs response costs, regardless of their own potential liability); see also Pinal Creek Group
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Ariz. 1996); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital,
Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Beazer East, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., No.
95-822, 1996 WL 421443 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 1996); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer &
Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Va. 1996); Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug
Brantley & Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Ky. 1995); Charter Township of Oshtemo
v. American Cyanamid Co., 910 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Town of Wallkill v. Tesa
Tape Inc., 891 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Taylor, 909 F. Supp. 355
(M.D.N.C. 1995); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D. Conn. 1994);
United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1994);
Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
"9 Despite this recent trend, there is still ample authority for district courts to restrict PRPs
to contribution actions. See, e.g., Boyce v. Bumb, 944 F. Supp. 807, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Current Controls, Inc., No. 93-CV-0950E(H), 1996 WL 528601,
at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 1996); United States v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 362,
364 (D. Colo. 1996); SC Holdings, Inc. v. A.A.A. Realty Co., 935 F. Supp. 1354, 1361
(D.N.J. 1996); Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671, 676-78
(D.N.J. 1996); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 197 B.R. 260, 276 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996);
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 920 F. Supp. 991, 994-97 (E.D. Ark.
1996); Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 662, 679-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Dartron Corp. v. Uniroyal Chem. Co., 917 F. Supp. 1173, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1996);
Johnson County Airport Comm'n v. Parsonitt Co., 916 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (D. Kan. 1996);
Saco Steel Co. v. Saco Defense, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 803, 809-10 (D. Me. 1995); Catellus Dev.
Corp. v. L.D. McFarland Co., 910 F. Supp. 1509, 1514-15 (D. Or. 1995); One Wheeler Road
Assocs. v. Foxboro Co., No. Civ. A. 90-12873-RGS, 1995 WL 791937, at *7, *12 (D. Mass.
Dec. 13, 1995); Waste Management of Pa., Inc. v. City of New York, 910 F. Supp. 1035,
1039 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Hydro-Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 903 F. Supp. 273,
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For example, plaintiffs who were also PRPs were permitted to seek
response costs under section 107(a) in Charter Township of Oshtemo v.
American Cyanamid Co. 197 In that case, the plaintiffs and other PRPs had
resolved their liability to the government through a consent decree.'98
Plaintiffs then filed a response cost recovery action pursuant to section
107(a).199 Defendants sought dismissal of the claim based on the plaintiffs'
status as PRPs.2 °°
The district court originally denied defendants motion to dismiss in
1993.21 On defendants' motion for reconsideration, the court again rejected
defendants' argument, concluding that CERCLA's plain language "provides
that parties meeting the definition of liable persons 'shall be liable for...
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person.'" 202
To reach this conclusion, the court relied on language from the Supreme
Court's decision in Key Tronic,2 °3 which stated that the "any other person"
language of section 107(a) implicitly granted a cause of action to parties
275-76 (D.R.I. 1995); Acme Fill Corp. v. Althin CD Med., Inc., No. C 91-4268 MMC, 1995
WL 822665, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1995); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS
Corp., 903 F. Supp. 771, 778-779 (D. Del. 1995); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv.,
901 F. Supp. 906, 911 (M.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Bay Area Battery, 895 F. Supp.
1524, 1532 (N.D. Fla. 1995); Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904 F.
Supp. 644 (N.D. Ohio 1995); City of Fresno v. NL Indus., Inc., No. CV-F 93-5091
REC/DLB, 1995 WL 641983 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 1995); Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron,
Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1121-25 (N.D. Fla 1995); Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F.
Supp. 1516, 1520-22 (D. Utah 1995); TH Agric. & Nutrition Co. v. Aceto Chem. Co., 884
F. Supp. 357, 360 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F.
Supp. 1212, 1216 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re Hexcel Corp., 174 B.R. 807, 810-812 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1994); Kamb v. United States Coast Guard, 869 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Cal.
1994); Folino v. Hampden Color & Chem. Co., 832 F. Supp. 757, 764 (D. Vt. 1993); City
& County of Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340, 346 (D. Colo. 1993); United
States v. Asarco, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951, 956 (D. Colo. 1993); Transtech Indus. v. A & Z
Septic Clean, 798 F. Supp. 1079, 1086 (D.N.J. 1992); Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825
F. Supp. 1132 (D.R.I. 1992).
197 910 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
' See id. at 334.
199 See id.
200 See id.
20 See Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., No. 1:92:CV:843, 1993
WL 561814 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1993).
202 Oshtemo, 910 F. Supp. at 334 (quoting section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994)).
203 511 U.S. 809 (1994); see also supra Part IV.A.
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including PRPs, and that such cause of action was "somewhat overlapping"
with the contribution right of action expressly provided in section 113(f).204
The court adopted a plain language approach to CERCLA and permitted a
PRP to seek response costs under section 107(a):
An interpretation that there is no longer a right of action under
section 107 for parties that themselves were liable under that
section renders the Supreme Court's reasoning and legal
conclusions [in Key Tronic] concerning section 107
meaningless. Such an interpretation also draws a distinction
between the rights of "innocent" private parties and the rights
of potentially liable parties to recover from other liable parties
that does not appear in the statute itself.2"5
The district court concluded that interpreting CERCLA so as to bar
section 107(a) cost recovery actions by PRPs "ignores the plain language of
section 107, serves some of the purposes of CERCLA less well, and appears
to conflict with the Supreme Court's language in Key Tronic. ' '2 °6 Permitting
PRPs to sue other PRPs for response costs under section 107(a), the court
held, better served the purposes of CERCLA:
[T]he purpose of CERCLA in having potentially liable parties
promptly undertake cleanup activities, rather than having
governmental agencies performing the cleanup activities and
later seeking reimbursement from potentially liable parties for
costs incurred, is better served by permitting private parties
that perform cleanup activities to seek joint and several
liability of other liable parties under section 107.207
Similarly, in Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp.,2"8 the U.S.
District Court for Connecticut permitted PRPs to seek response costs from
other PRPs under section 107(a).2"9 Interpreting the plain language of
204 Oshtemo, 910 F. Supp. at 337 (citing Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at 816, 818 n. 11).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 338.
208 853 F. Supp. 575 (D. Conn. 1994).
209 See id. at 576.
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CERCLA, the court concluded that Congress' use of the phrase "any other
person," combined with the narrow categories of defenses to CERCLA
liability, mandated the interpretation that Congress intended the liability
provision of CERCLA to sweep broadly, so as to permit cost recovery actions
by PRPs under section 107(a). t0
A federal district court in Missouri reached the same conclusion in
Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,,'" stating:
The plain language of sections 107 and 113 does not indicate
that PRPs are prohibited from bringing claims pursuant to
Section 107. Section 107 imposes liability on PRPs for
necessary response costs "incurred by any other person."
While the private right of action under section 107 is implied,
there is no indication that the private right of action is limited
to "innocent" private parties."'
The court held that this conclusion was appropriate because "the text of §
113(0 provides a right of action for contribution, but does not provide that
it is the exclusive remedy for PRPs. '213
In Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp.,21 4 a
Pennsylvania federal district court similarly followed the plain language
approach when confronted with the issue of PRP standing under section
107(a). There, plaintiffs-PRPs sought cleanup and other response costs from
numerous defendants pursuant to section 107(a).2 5  The Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection ("PDEP") targeted more than 900
PRPs, including plaintiffs, regarding a release or threatened release of
21' See id. at 579.
211 925 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
212 Id. at 630 (citations omitted).
213 Id. at 631; see also Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400,
1406 n.7 (D. Ariz. 1996) (noting that Congress created section 113 to confirm the existing
case law which "generally interpreted Section 107 broadly to afford a cause of action to
liable and non-liable parties alike"); Companies for Fair Allocation, 853 F. Supp. at 579.
214 931 F. Supp. 1231 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
215 See id. at 1235.
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hazardous substances at a site in Pennsylvania.216 The plaintiffs agreed to act
as site response providers to facilitate and finance the cleanup of the site.217
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sued other PRPs pursuant to sections 107(a) and
113(f), seeking to recover the cleanup costs incurred with respect to the
site.2t
The defendants opposed plaintiffs' request for relief, arguing that
plaintiffs, as PRPs under CERCLA, could not bring a section 107(a) cost
recovery action. 219 The defendants based their argument on those cases
suggesting that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, prohibited cost recovery
actions by PRPs. 220 In response, the plaintiffs argued that, despite such case
law, the plain language of CERCLA and SARA, and Congress' intent behind
those acts permit PRPs to pursue cost recovery actions under section
107(a).221
The court agreed with the plaintiffs. 222 After reviewing the statutory
framework and the policies behind CERCLA, the court agreed with the
"growing body of case law" and concluded that "the 'any other person'
language of section 107(a)(4)(B) confers standing on persons who incur
response costs regardless of heir own potential liability. '223 To conclude
otherwise, the court noted, would amount to improperly rewriting CERCLA
to add an innocent requirement where no such requirement could be found in
the statute itself: "The court finds no reason to give the phrase 'any other
person' other than its plain meaning. While the phrase may be expansive, its
meaning is not unclear .... [T]he court 'refuses to engraft the word
216 See id. The site, known as the Industrial Solvent & Chemical Company ("ISCC") site,
is located in Newberry Township, York County, Pennsylvania. See id. PDEP placed the
ISCC site on the Pennsylvania Priority List for remedial response on October 26, 1991. See
id. at 1236.
217 See id. Plaintiffs accomplished this by entering into three separate consent orders
and agreements. See id.
218 See id. at 1235. Plaintiffs also asserted various claims under Pennsylvania's version
of CERCLA and other state laws. See id.
219 See id. at 1236.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See id. at 1246.
223 Id. at 1238.
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"innocent" onto the phrase "any [other] person" set forth in Section
107(a)(4)(B). ''2 24
In so concluding, the Pennsylvania district court expressly rejected
the supposed majority line of cases. 225 The court explained that those rulings
rest upon an interpretation of the statute which concludes that section 107(a)
governs liability and section 113 governs allocation of damages. 26 One of
the primary concerns of the courts following that line of cases is that, if one
PRP were permitted to recover costs from another PRP under section 107(a),
then section 113(f) would be eviscerated.227 Rejecting this unfounded
concern, the court recognized the interplay between cost recovery actions
under section 107(a) and contribution actions under section 113(f). 228 When
read together, any person who initiates a Superfund site cleanup may seek
response costs under section 107(a) from other PRPs.229 When the plaintiffs
in that initial section 107(a) action happen to also be PRPs, any defendant-
PRP can assert a contribution counterclaim pursuant to section 113(f). 230 The
contribution counterclaim ensures that a plaintiff-PRP does not avoid paying
its equitable share of the cleanup costs.2 1 This two-step framework, the court
held, "effectuates CERCLA's goals by providing incentives for private
parties to promptly initiate cleanup, while simultaneously ensuring that costs
will eventually be allocated in an equitable manner. 232
Permitting PRPs to pursue cost recovery actions, the court concluded,
was consistent with the plain language of the statute and better served
Congress' intent behind enacting CERCLA:
The court finds that the "any other person" language in § 107
means "any other person" regardless- of that person's
CERCLA culpability. According the language of the statute
224 Id. at 1239 (citation omitted) (quoting Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
926 F. Supp. 1400, 1407 (D. Ariz. 1996)).
225 See id. at 1241.
226 See id.
227 See id. (citing United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995); Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671, 678 (D.N.J. 1996)).
228 See Adhesives Research, 931 F. Supp. at 1244 (citing Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont
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its plain meaning is consistent with effectuating the broad
remedial goals of CERCLA by encouraging parties to
promptly and voluntarily initiate cleanup or settlement, and
discouraging parties from refusing to participate in voluntary
cleanup efforts or avoiding settlement. In permitting PRPs to
pursue cost recovery actions, the court provides PRPs who
initiate cleanup or settlement with two valuable procedural
tools-the longer six-year statute of limitations, and the
shifting of the burden of proof as to divisibility of harm to the
defendant PRPs. Contrary to what some would argue, the
court does not thereby provide plaintiff PRPs with a windfall.
Defendant PRPs may cross-claim for contribution pursuant to
§ 113, thereby permitting the court to ultimately apportion
liability equitably between the parties. Such an interpretation
and application of CERCLA merely assists in accomplishing
CERCLA's goals by providing all parties with a strong
incentive to put the environment first.233
Likewise, in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron &
Metal Co.,234 EPA issued an administrative order under section 10623
requiring a PRP, Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company ("C&P"), who
allegedly arranged -to dispose. of hazardous substances, to clean up a
contaminated site.236 C&P then filed a private cost recovery action under
section 107(a).237 The defendants in the cost recovery action moved for
partial summary judgment arguing that a PRP could not maintain a section
233 Id. at 1246 (footnote omitted).
234 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992).
235 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994). An administrative order issued pursuant to section 106 of
CERCLA is not a "civil action." See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action
to be known as 'civil action."). "Civil action," though not defined in CERCLA, "is a term
of art judicially and statutorily defined as one 'commenced by filing a complaint with [a]
court,' not an executive board." Oppenheim v. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 663 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (quoting N.V. Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy.Comm'n, 316 F.2d
401,406 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). It has been held that the phrase "civil action" does not refer to
administrative proceedings. See Toner v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 899, 901 (3d Cir. 1980)(holding that the term "civil action" under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 does not apply to administrative actions).
236 See C&P Telephone, 814 F. Supp.,at 1272-73.
237 See id. at 1273.
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107(a) cost recovery action against other PRPs.2 38 Disagreeing, the district
court concluded that nothing in the language of the statute precludes a PRP
from seeking response costs from other PRPs under section 107(a):
Nothing in the statute supports the assertion that only the
United States Government or an "innocent" plaintiff can bring
a cost recovery action under Section 107(a). To the contrary,
the statute specifically provides that covered persons shall be
liable to both the United States Government, among others,
and to "any other person" who incurs response costs ....
... In the absence of a "clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary," the language of the statute itself
"must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Nothing in the
statute indicates that only "innocent" persons fall within the
definition of "any other person." '239
Based on the plain language of the statute, the court permitted one PRP to sue
other PRPs for cost recovery under section 107(a) where that PRP cleaned up
the site pursuant to a section 106 administrative order.2 40 Therefore, under
C&P Telephone, a plaintiff-PRP who cleans up a Superfund site pursuant to
an EPA administrative order issued under section 106 can maintain a section
107(a) cost recovery action against other PRPs. Forcing a PRP to step into
the EPA's shoes and conduct costly remedial action under section 106, but
denying that PRP the ability to seek response costs under section 107, would
discourage PRs from cooperating with the EPA.
241
238 See id.
239 Id. at 1277 (citations omitted).
240 Subsequent district court opinions in the Fourth Circuit have also permitted PRPs to
pursue cost recovery actions under section 107(a). See, e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v.
Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Taylor,
909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
241 See, e.g., United States v. SCA Servs. of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1283 (N.D.
Ind. 1994). In SCA, the court permitted a PRP, who cleaned up a site pursuant to a consent
decree, to seek response costs from other PRPs under section 107 because the plaintiffs
liability had not been determined in the consent decree. See id. at 1282-83. The court noted
that the plaintiff "is not a 'liable' party as that term is generally used in the legal setting,"
Id. at 1283. The court further stated that a contribution claim is "a claim in which one liable
party attempts to recover from another potentially liable party for its share of the cost" Id.
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.In United States v. Taylor,2 42 a federal district court in North Carolina
concluded that nongovernmental PRPs which were compelled to conduct a
cleanup by a section 106 order should be entitled to seek response costs under
section 107(a) from other PRPs. Explaining its rationale, the court noted:
Such a party may not be an "innocent or noble volunteer."
However; without an adjudication of guilt, a party under a
Section 106 order must comply with the administrative order
or face fines of up to $25,000 per day. It is difficult to
understand why being the target or victim of such a draconian
order should disqualify one from seeking out others who are
also liable. Such parties play a vital role in achieving the
important goals of CERCLA.243
The plain language of CERCLA permits one PRP to seek response
costs from other PRPs pursuant to section 107(a). Section 107(a)(4)(B) does
not limit a PRP's liability to non-PRPs. Nor does section 107(a)(4)(B) limit
a PRP's liability to "innocent" PRPs. The clear language of CERCLA
provides, without limitation, that a PRP shall be liable to "any other
person. ' '2' Barring PRPs from pursuing cost recovery actions under section
107(a) improperly engrafts an "innocence" requirement to the "any other
person" language which CERCLA does not. support.
Imposing the "innocent PRP" limitation to CERCLA liability
completely ignores the "any other person" statutory language from CERCLA
because no "innocent" party would risk paying millions of dollars for
Superfund cleanup and be subject to potential reimbursement limited to a
contribution action under section 113(f). "Any other person" who cleans up
hazardous substances and incurs response costs will virtually always be a
PRP. That person's "innocence" or "guilt" should not be a basis for
determining liability under CERCLA where Congress provided for no such
consideration. Such an interpretation is consistent with other provisions of
CERCLA.
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
242 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
243 Id. at 364 (citations omitted).
244 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994).
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VI. THE DIFFERENT STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS UNDER CERCLA SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION THAT PRPS CAN SEEK RESPONSE COSTS FROM OTHER
PRPs UNDER SECTION 107(a)(4)(B)
A comparison of the statutes of limitations for cost recovery and
contribution actions also reinforces the conclusion that a PRP should be
permitted to sue other PRPs under section 107(a) of CERCLA. The statute
of limitations for a contribution claim begins to run on the date of judgment,
administrative order, or entry of a judicially approved settlement concerning
costs or damages.2 45 By contrast, the statute of limitations on a claim to
recover removal costs begins to run after completion of the removal, and a
claim to recover remedial costs begins to run after initiation of physical on-
site construction of the remediation.2 46 If PRPs that clean up a site without
being sued by the government, for example at the insistence of a section 106
order, are only permitted to raise claims under section 113(f), then arguably
no statute of limitations applies to these parties' claims. Such an anomaly
cannot, and should not, be presumed to have been written into CERCLA by
Congress.
Rather, an interpretation of CERCLA that avoids such an anomaly in
the statutory language should be adopted by the courts. For example, the
court in United States v. Taylor247 confronted this dilemma. There, the court
construed the differing statutes of limitations in section 113(g) and concluded
that the PRP who initiates and conducts a cleanup, regardless of the PRP's
motivation, is taking the type of remedial action referred to in section
113(g)(2), subject to the six-year statute of limitations as an initial action.2 48
Where, however, a party has been subjected to a judgment or a court
approved settlement, such party is subject to the three-year statute of
limitations under section 11 3(g)(3) for that party's contribution action.249
This interpretation, the court noted, avoided a reading of CERCLA which
would leave a class of PRPs without a statute of limitations for their cause of
action.25' Additionally, such interpretation would not render section 113(f)
meaningless because when a PRP does not conduct a cleanup, that PRP has
245 See id. § 9613(g)(3).
246 See id. § 9613(g)(2).
247 909 F. Supp. 355 (M.D.N.C. 1995).
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not incurred response costs and cannot therefore bring a section 107(a)
action.25" '
When read in context, CERCLA's various statutes of limitations
cover all possible causes of action under CERCLA. The existence of the
different statutes of limitations supports the conclusion that Congress
intended PRPs, in certain situations, to have standing to seek response costs
under section 107(a).
VII. THE FACT THAT CONGRESS PROVIDED ONLY THREE DEFENSES TO
CERCLA LIABILITY SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT PRPS CAN SEEK
RESPONSE COSTS FROM OTHER PRPs UNDER SECTION 107(a)(4)(B)
Additional support for the broad interpretation of CERCLA's liability
provision, such that PRPs can seek response costs from other PRPs under
section 107(a), is found in the narrow statutory defenses to CERCLA
liability. There is no liability where the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances was caused solely by: "(1) an act of God; (2) an act of
War; (3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant. 2z 2 Courts have consistently held that these three statutory
defenses are the only defenses to CERCLA liability.2"3 These limited
defenses do not draw a distinction between innocent and culpable plaintiffs.
For example, in Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp.,254 the court
concluded that the narrow categories of defenses to CERCLA liability
demonstrated Congress' intent that the liability provision sweep broadly,
including permitting PRP cost recovery actions against other PRPs.25s To
allow the innocence or guilt of a plaintiff to be a defense to CERCLA
liability constitutes an impermissible judicial revision of CERCLA.256
251 See id.
252 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1994).
253 See, e.g., Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1445-46 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (citing other cases that support this notion).
254 853 F. Supp. 575 (D. Conn. 1994).
255 See id. at 579.
256 See id. The innocence of a plaintiff does not constitute a complete defense to CERCLA
liability. Rather, it would only prohibit that plaintiff from seeking response costs under
section 107(a), but would not prohibit that plaintiff from seeking contribution under section
113(f).
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VIII. THE FACT THAT CONGRESS LIMITED REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE
SUPERFUND TO INNOCENT PARTIES, BUT IMPOSED No SIMILAR INNOCENCE
RESTRICTION ON COST RECOVERY ACTIONS, SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION
THAT PRPs HAVE STANDING UNDER SECTION 107(a)
Additional support for the proposition that Congress did not intend to
have the innocence of the plaintiff in a cost recovery action be a relevant
consideration is found in section 106(b)(2)(C).257 In that provision, Congress
restricted reimbursement from Superfund to a person who can "establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that it is not liable for response costs under
section 9607(a). '258 The fact that Congress expressly limited Superfund
reimbursement to those "not liable for response costs 259 demonstrates that
Congress considered the guilt or innocence of a plaintiff under CERCLA to
be relevant only in the context of reimbursement from Superfund. That
Congress provided no similar "innocence" restriction under section 107(a)
bolsters the conclusion that the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff is irrelevant
under a section 107(a) cost recovery action.
IX. CONCLUDING THAT ONE PRP MAY NOT SUE ANOTHER PRP
FOR COST RECOVERY UNDER SECTION 107(a)
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND CERCLA
Congress passed CERCLA with the intention of providing a "solution
to the environmental and health problems created by decades of reckless and
irresponsible disposal of chemical wastes. 260 Congress had two overriding
objectives in enacting CERCLA: (1) to immediately give the federal
government the tools to promptly and effectively respond to the national
hazardous waste problem; and (2) to hold those who caused chemical harm
responsible for the costs associated with hazardous waste cleanup.261
257 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(C).
258 Id. A person who is liable for response costs may seek reimbursement from Superfund
only where that person can demonstrate that "the response action ordered was arbitrary and
capricious or was otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. § 9606(b)(2)(D).
259 Id.
260 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 62 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6139
(statement of Senator Albert Gore, Jr.).
261 See United States v: SCAServs. of Indiana, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1284 (N.D. Ind.
1994).
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Permitting PRP cost recovery actions serves both of Congress' goals in
enacting CERCLA by encouraging the timely cleanup of Superfund sites by
liable and potentially liable parties.262
Permitting a PRP to recover response costs against other PRPs under
section 107(a) furthers Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA. For example,
the federal district court in Companies for Fair Allocation held that:
If PRPs were precluded from pursuing claims for joint and
several liability under § 107, and limited to contribution
claims and several liability, "a PRP who is otherwise
.amenable to cleanup may be discouraged from doing so if it
knows that, where the harm is indivisible, its only recourse
for reimbursement is contribution from the solvent PRPs." 26 3
Likewise, in Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co.,2" the court concluded that
"[f]inding that potentially responsible and responsible parties have standing
to seek reimbursement for their response costs under section 9607(a) supports
the underlying policy of encouraging prompt and complete response actions
to this extremely dangerous contamination."2 65 • "To conclude otherwise
would discourage voluntary clean-up by PRPs. ' '2 66
Permitting PRPs to seek response costs under section 107(a) is also,
consistent with the broad remedial purposes of CERCLA.267 Insofar as
CERCLA is a remedial statute, it should be interpreted broadly to permit
PRPs to seek response costs from other PRPs under section 107(a). The
district court in Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad
262 See id.
263 Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. .Supp. 575, 579 (D. Conn. 1994)
(quoting Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents, 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
264 790 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
261 Id. at 717.
26 Barmet Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 159, 164 (W.D.
Ky. 1995) (concluding that a PRP should not be limited to a contribution action under §
113).
267 See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564 (10th Cir.
1996); see also Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 1290, 1314
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Given the broad remedial purpose of CERCLA, and construing the
statute in this broad fashion, this court will follow [those'decisions] that have permitted a
PRP which has entered into a consent order to bring an action under both § 107 and § 113
of CERCLA.").
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Co.,268 for example, concluded that permitting PRPs to seek response costs
under section 107(a) enabled the court "to accomplish several of the statute's
goals at once. "269 There, the court permitted PRPs to seek response costs
under section 107(a) because such action: (1) preserves the statute's
incentives for PRPs to settle and settle early; (2) allows plaintiffs to avoid
litigation costs by settling with the United States through a consent decree;
(3) subjects parties that refuse to settle with the United States to joint and
several liability; and (4) enables non-settling parties to be held liable for any
orphan shares.27° Congress' goals in enacting CERCLA, and the benefits to
the public health and the environment, outweigh any potential prejudice or
inconvenience to non-settling defendants which may arise as a result of
permitting PRPs to pursue cost recovery actions under section 107(a) of
CERCLA.
X. CONCLUSION
Under the plain language of section 107(a) of CERCLA, PRPs are
liable for all necessary response costs, consistent with the NCP, incurred by
another in cleaning up a Superfund site. CERCLA does not impose an
"innocence" requirement upon standing to seek response costs under section
107(a). Despite CERCLA's plain language, numerous courts have rewritten
CERCLA to impose an "innocence" requirement for standing under section
107(a). These courts improperly conclude that an action for response costs
by one PRP against other PRPs is really an action for contribution governed
by section 113(f).
Restricting PRPs who clean up Superfund sites, whether voluntarily
or through force, to contribution actions under section 113(f) discourages
PRPs from taking a cooperative role in cleaning up Superfund sites. No PRP
will voluntarily conduct a cleanup of a Superfund site knowing that its
recovery of the expenses for that cleanup will be limited to the more
restrictive contribution action under section 113(f), with its shorter statute of
limitations and arguably several liability. Reading an "innocence"
requirement into the statute impermissibly rewrites CERCLA, seriously
undermines Congress' objectives in enacting CERCLA, and jeopardizes the
26 921 F. Supp., 336 (E.D. Va. 1996).
2"69 Id. at 347.
270 See id. at 347-48.
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future effectiveness of the cleanup of Superfund sites throughout the United
States.
The better reasoned view is that which has been adopted by a recent
trend in district courts: under CERCLA's plain language, a PRP has standing
to seek response costs under CERCLA and is wholly consistent with
Congress' intent behind enacting CERCLA. Permitting PRPs to seek cost
recovery under section 107(a), with its generous statute of limitations and
liability provisions, encourages PRPs to step forward and finance Superfund
cleanups. The end result is that PRPs conduct Superfund cleanups, rather
than the government, thereby accomplishing Congress' primary goals behind
CERCLA-cleaning up the environment at the expense of those who caused
the contamination.
